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Abstract. Many regions in America are experiencing downward trends in the number of practicing physicians and the number of 
awilable physician hours, resuHing in a worrisome decrease in the availability of heaHh care services. Recent changes in American 
health care legislation may induce a rapkl change in the demand for health care serv;ces, which in tum "";11 resu t in a new supply-
demand equilibrium . In this paper we develop a system dynamics modelliriling physician availabilrty to health care demard and 
profrtability. We use this model to explore scenarios based on di fferent initial conditions and describe possible outcomes fo r a range 
01 different policy decisions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Towards the end of the 1990's, researchers 
had taken note of a declining trend in the 
number of available physicians [1]. This 
trend continues into the present, and new 
research has linked physician accessibility 
with quality of healthcare and has also 
suggested a link to health outcomes [2). 
Amidst this trend, new health care 
legislation has recently passed [3] which is 
aimed at dramatically increasing the number 
of Americans with access to health care 
through a government competitor to private 
insurance. A change of this magnitude can 
be anticipated to have a significant effect on 
the provision of health care services and 
may potentially have many unintended 
consequences. Many important decision 
variables come into play including the 
number of people to insure, the tax levels, 
and the physician reimbursement levels, to 
name a few. From basic economic 
principles it follows that as a profession's 
profit decreases while its labor workload 
increases, that profession becomes less 
and less desirable resulting in a decreased 
labor force . In this paper we examine 
potential effects for a number of possible 
health care policy decisions on physician 
availability. We developed a system 
dynamics model to describe the introduction 
of a government competitor to private 
insurance. Using this model we begin with a 
control scenario and proceed to explore six 
different scenarios obtained by modifying 
different input parameters. Each scenario 
reflects a different policy dimension. We 
report the results and provide a discussion 
of the dynamics observed. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
We developed a system dynamics (SO) 
model to explore the effects of introducing a 
government competitor to private insurance. 
This model aims to describe the inter-
relationships between public and private 
insurance levels to tota l health care 
demand, tax levels imposed on physicians, 
physician profitability, physician workload, 
overall desirability of the profession, and 
overall physician supply. SO (5] is a 
continuous modeling and simulation 
paradigm based on fluid flows between 
reservoirs. In contrast to more common 
simulation paradigms (such as agent-based 
or discrete-event) which model behavior in 
terms of the individual entities, SO models 
behavior at the aggregate level. Th is makes 
it a very suitable paradigm for exploring 
high-level policy decisions. SO has been 
employed on a wide variety of policy studies 
in diverse areas such as health care (6] , [7], 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110012114 2019-08-29T18:31:59+00:00Z
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supply chain management [8], and 
organizational management [9]. 
In this study we develop a hypothetical 
control scenario based very loosely on the 
legislated policy change. In particular, we 
assume that at the scenario start (Jan. 1 
2010), 60% of the US population is covered 
under private insurance. We assume that 
starting Jan. 1 2020 the government will 
mandate that 95% of the population be 
covered, either via private insurance or via a 
newly introduced public option. We then test 
six different treatments in isolation against 
the control : 1) High Physician Tax, 2) Low 
Physician Tax, 3) Low Government 
Reimbursement, 4) High Private Turnover, 
5) High Government Dissatisfaction, and 6) 
High Long-Term Private Insurance 
Affordability. These treatments correspond 
to different policy decisions or effects of 
particular policy decisions, and are obtained 
by modifying certain input parameters from 
the control levels. Only treatments in 
isolation are considered; treatment 
interactions are not considered. The 
simulation horizon in each scenario is over 
a 50-year period, beginning on Jan. 1 2010 
and ending on Jan. 1 2060. 
This study does not attempt to predict what 
will happen as a result of the policy 
changes. Rather, it aims to understand the 
dynamics that come into play by exploring a 
Fig. 1: A causal loop diagram 
hypothetical set of scenarios loosely based 
on legislated policy changes. Furthermore, 
system dynamics by nature characterizes 
system behavior patterns at a very high 
level of aggregation. It is thus accurate, but 
not necessarily precise. As a consequence, 
the results of this study are not to be 
understood in terms of concrete quantities, 
but rather in terms of how the system will 
behave over time relative to the initial 
conditions. 
3. SYSTEM DYNAMICS PRIMER 
SO [5] is a continuous modeling and 
simulation paradigm based on fluid flows 
between reservoirs (referred to as stocks). 
Stocks are filled and emptied by inflows and 
outflows. Differential equations describe 
flow rates in and out of the stocks contained 
within the system. Two types of diagrams 
are commonly used in SO: 1) a causal loop 
diagram, and 2) a stock-and-f1ow diagram. 
The causal loop is purely a conceptual aid 
that identifies key system components and 
captures the positive or negative influences 
that different system components exert on 
each other. The stock-and-flow diagram is 
an executable simulation model that 
identifies the system stocks and flows, as 
well as specifies the different rates of flow. 
An example of each type of model is shown 
in Figure 1 and 2 below: 
In Flow 
Constant Auxiliary Variable 
Fig. 2: A stock-and-flow model 
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In Figure 1, the positive arrow going from A 
to B indicates that as A increases, B 
increases. Similarly, the negative arrow 
indicates that as B increases, A decreases. 
In Figure 2, stocks are symbolized by boxes 
and flows by the pipes going in and out of 
stocks. The clouds represent infinite 
sources (going in) and sinks (going out) . 
The in- and out-flow rates are determined 
solely by the flow valves (represented as 
circles with triangles on top). However, the 
flow rates can be based on virtually any 
pertinent component, including stocks, 
auxiliary variables (represented as circles) , 
and constants (represented by diamonds). 
This enables fully dynamic relations 
between system components to be 
modeled. Arrows represent input into flow 
rates or auxiliary variables, which are 
specified as rate equations based on the 
inputs. For example, 'Auxiliary Variable = 
Constant * 5IYear' , or 'Out Flow = 0.5 * 
Stock * Auxiliary VariablelYear'. 
4. SYSTEM MODEL 
We begin the modeling with a causal loop 
diagram and proceed to use this diagram to 
develop a full stock-and-flow model. In 
reality there are a vast number of factors 
that may have an effect on the healthcare 
system. However, out of practical concern 
we restrict the scope of our modeling to 
capture the interaction of only the key 
variables we are interested in. The causal 
loop diagram is shown in Figure 3. In this 
model the government plan is assumed to 
be a competitor to private insurance; 
consequently, they negatively influence 
each other. However, an increase in either 
category will increase the demand for 
healthcare services. An increase in the 
government insured level will also 
presumably increase the level of taxes on 
physicians, which will decrease profits. An 
increase in the government insured level 
may also directly decrease profits if the 
government limits physician reimbursement 
levels, as has been done with Medicaid [4] . 
• 
I 
tnsured 
PhYSk lall \ 
.... Supply 
• 
.... 
Desirability 
of .... 
Profession 
PhySician 
Wor kload 
Insured 
Fig. 3: Causal loop diagram 
~ 
As healthcare demand increases physician 
profits will increase through increased 
revenues; however, their workload will also 
increase. Intuitively, an increase in profits 
will positively influence the desirability of the 
medical profession, while an increased 
workload will negatively influence it. 
Similarly, the desirability of the profession 
will positively influence the physician supply. 
Finally, an increase to physician supply can 
be expected to decrease physician 
workload through load balancing. 
The stock-and-flow model is shown in 
Figure 4. As can be observed, this model 
has a fair1y large number of variables and 
interactions. It is thus infeasible in this 
length-limited paper to provide a detailed 
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description of all components. Therefore, 
we provide a model overview emphasizing 
aspects most directly related to physician 
, 
, 
, 
, 
,.~--'V1r;ne'­
" ... 
... 
>-_-""ot.,,IO m"nd 
Annual Revenue Per 
Percent 
Relative Physician 
Workload 
Fig. 4: Stock-and-flow model 
Annual Revenue 
In this model, the diamonds with a thumb 
tack on them are user-adjustable input 
parameters. The percentages of private and 
government-insured Americans are 
modeled as stocks. A certain percentage of 
the population flows between the private 
and government insured; however, this 
does not begin to occur until the policy 
enactment date (Jan. 1 2020 in this 
simulation). At this time there witt be an 
influx of newly insured (equal to the 
difference in mandated insured percentage 
supply. More detail (including equations 
used for each variable) can be obtained by 
contacting the authors. 
"," In oduction 
G ev ue 
" 
'Ib Able 0 afford 
private nsurance 
Gvt Dissatisfaction 
~------"G"'vt Payment 
DiverQance Rate 
Min Gvt Payment 
Rate 
Gen Tax Multip~er 
Personal Use 
minus the current private insured level), 
presumably into the government plan. The 
auxiliary variables shown with clocks 
designate that they utilize the start date as 
input. 
Physician incomes and profits are also 
represented as stocks. In this study we are 
not interested in the actual amounts of 
revenues or profits; we are only interested 
in the changes in these quantities relative to 
the starting level. We thus use a normalized 
value for physician income and profit, 
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initially set to 1. As can be seen, physician 
revenues have two basic sources: public 
and private insurance. In order to model the 
potentially limited level of government 
reimbursement (compared to private 
insurance) we utilize a "Relati ve 
Government Payment Level" variable. This 
starts the government reimbursement level 
at 100% of the private level at the start of 
the policy enactment, and gradually 
decreases it by a specified percent each 
year (specified by the "Gvt. Payment 
Divergence Rate" constant) until the 
terminal level is reached (specified by the 
"Min Gvt. Payment Rate" constant). In this 
model we are only concerned with the 
effects of taxes on physicians (as opposed 
to the general population). Thus, we use 
two constants, "General Tax Multiplier" and 
"Annual Revenue per Percent" to initialize 
the normalized revenue to 1. Ultimately, the 
physician tax level is an independent 
variable that can be set directly by policy 
makers. Consequently, we model this as an 
input constant rather than something 
determined by emergent system behavior. 
Finally, the physician supply is determined 
by the profession desirability. It is difficult to 
objectively quantify desirability. However, 
increased desirability must increase the 
number of incoming and decrease the 
number of outgoing physicians. Thus, in 
terms of this study desirability is defined as 
the relative profit divided by the relative 
workload. The relati ve profit is defined as 
the current profit level divided by the starting 
profit level, and the relative workload is 
defined as the current workload divided by 
the starting workload. The notion of 
desirability only makes sense when 
compared to a starting frame of reference. 
As a consequence, starting profit and 
workload levels are set to 1, which initializes 
the desirability to 1. Values higher than 1 
thus indicate a higher-than-starting 
desirability; values less than 1 indicate a 
lower-than-starting desirability. Physician 
supply is represented as a stock, initially set 
to 300,000. Physician supply inflow and 
outflow is determined by desirability, a 
constant base entrance/exit rate, and 
current physician supply level, where 
(1) New MDs = Physician Supply • 
Desirability· Base Entrance Rate 
(2) Leaving Field = Physician Supply· (1 I 
Desirability) • Base Exit Rate 
Base entrance/exit rates were set to 2% per 
year. Thus, an increase in desirability wi ll 
increase the rate at which new physicians 
enter the field and slow the exit rate , while a 
decrease will have exactly the opposite 
effect. 
5. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
We used the Powersim software package to 
build our simulation model and execute a 
sequence of scenarios. Using our model , 
we first developed a relatively stable control 
scenario. We then proceeded to test six 
different treatments individually and 
compare them against the control: 1) High 
Physician Tax, 2) Low Physician Tax, 3) 
Low Government Reimbursement, 4) High 
Private Turnover, 5) High Government 
Dissatisfaction, and 6) High Long-Time 
Private Insurance Affordability. These 
treatments were obtained by modifying 
certain input parameters from the control 
levels. We only considered treatments in 
isolation rather than considering treatment 
interactions. The parameters for each 
scenario are shown in Table 1. In non-
control scenarios, only parameters that 
differ from control levels are specified. 
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Low 
Parameter Control Hi Tax Ta> 
Required Coverage 0.95 
Initial Insurance Level O.G 
Private Turnover 0. 52 
Gvt. Dissatisfaction 0.52 
% Able to afford private 
insurance (Long term) O. l S 
Min Gvt. Payment Rate D .• 
Gvt. Payment Divergence 
Rate 0.15 
Phys Tax Level 0.4 O.G 0.2 
Gen Tax Multiplier 0.5 
Base Entrance Rate 0.02 
Base Exit Rate 0.02 
Table 1. Experiment parameter settings 
In each scenario the same values were 
used for mandated (required) coverage 
level, initial insurance level , general tax 
multiplier, government payment divergence 
rate , and base entrance/exit rates. 
Additionally, the normalized revenue and 
profit levels were set to the initial values of 
1, and the physician supply stock was 
initialized to 300,000. The private insured 
stock was set to the initial coverage level of 
0.6 (corresponding to 60% of the 
population) and the government insured 
was initialized to O. Each scenario had a 
start date of Jan. 1 2010, with a policy 
enactment date of Jan. 1 2020. Finally, 
each scenario had a simulation horizon of 
50 years, ending on Jan. 1 2060. 
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The simulation results are summarized in 
Table 2. As can be seen in the results, a 
common feature of each scenario is a spike 
Scenario 
High High 
High Gvt. Affordabi l ity 
Low Gvt Private Dissatis of Private 
Payment Turnover -faction Insurance 
0.8 
0.7 
O.S 
O.G 
in both the number of physicians and the 
physician workloads at the onset of the new 
policy enactment. Because in each scenario 
the government reimbursement begins at 
100% of the private rate, there is a 
corresponding increase in profits at the start 
of the policy change. This appears to be 
due to sheer increase in revenues resulting 
from the increased demand. 
As time moves for.vard into the future , the 
diverging effects of different treatments can 
be seen. The control results in a relatively 
stable increase in physician supply 
corresponding to the increase in demand. 
High physician taxes, low government 
reimbursement , and high private turnover 
result in increased physician workloads and 
decreased physician supply. Of these three, 
a low government reimbursement rate 
appears to induce the strongest decline in 
physician availability. By contrast, low 
physician taxes, high government 
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dissatisfaction, and high private insurance 
affordability lead to increases in physician 
Scenario Ph sieian S~v 
Control '~~I 3:5",000 
~.~ 
' Oft "., 2"." 'o~ "., 20<O 
High Physician Tax '.-~ 300,000 
250,000 
200,000 
lon 0., 2".0 'o~ 0', ZC>40 
Low Physician Tax ~ "0,000 '00,000 4'0,000 400,000 3.",000 JOO,"OO 
'on "., 2O." '0" " • • 2040 
Low Government 400,000 ~ Reimbursement 300,000 200,000 .00,000 
'on 0., 20.0 'on 0., ,0000 
High Private Turnover '~-r\ 3'0,000 
300,000 
2SO,OOO 
Jon 0., ,0.0 ,on 0., 200" 
High Government / ,~~ Dissatisfaction -.~ .~~ 000,000 ,~~ ~.~ 
>on 0., 20.0 'o~ 0., 2""" 
High Long-Term "~~u Private Insurance Affordability 
' ,000,000 
• Jon 0., 20.0 JOn 0 . , 2""" 
Table 2, Summary of Simulation results 
supply and decreased workloads, with the 
last of these producing the strongest effect. 
Ph sic ian Workload Private Insured 
•• 
.. ,
., 
... 
V\ 
.. 
... 
.. , 
., 
... 
. .. 
'0" 0' , ."." 'on "., ,0<" ,on 0., 20.0 ,on 0., 20<0 
" 
•• 
.. , 
" 
... 
,., ,, ~ .. , 
.. h ••• 
,on 0 . , 20 . 0 ,on 0 . , 20<O 
lo" 0., 20.0 lo" 0., ~040 
" 
... 
~ .. , .. ~ •.. .. ., .. .. , . .. Jon 0., 20." Jon 0., 20<" 
10,,0' , 20.0 10n 0., 2046 
... , 
, .. , 
, .. 
• .., 
, 
.. , 
, 
•• 
• ,on 0 . , 10 . 0 ,on 0., ,000 
Jon "', 2"'" 'on "','0411 
"/ ... ,., '.' .. , '., .. , 
..• 
• •• 
'on "., 20.0 'on 0., Z""" 
'on 0', ,010 lon "','~ 
... 
.. ,~ I  .., .. '.' .. ., 
.. , .. 
'o~ 0., ,0.0 ,on 0., 20<00 ,on 0., 20.0 ,on 0., ,000 
... 
"G ., ., •• 
•• 
.. , 
Jon 01, ."." Jon "., ,0<0" Jon 0., z •• " Jon •• , Z""" 
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Several of these results appear to be 
counterintuitive, particularly 1) the high 
government dissatisfaction leading to 
increased physician supply, and 2) the 
disproportionately strong effect of high long-
term private insurance affordabi'ity. High 
government dissatisfaction results in a 
larger number of people able to afford 
private coverage that choose that option. 
This increase in privatization leads to higher 
profits from lower numbers of government-
limited reimbursements. The 
disproportionately strong effect of private 
insurance affordability is probably due to the 
control calibration of the "General Tax 
Multiplier" and ~Annual Revenue per 
Percenf' constants, as well as not including 
other limiting factors (e.g. medical school 
capacities) in the model. Although the 
numbers shown are not necessarily precise, 
they do give a reasonable indication of the 
emergent system behavior. 
In summary, the results indicate that 
decisions which increase physician profits 
wi ll increase physician availability, while 
those that decrease profits will decrease 
physician availability. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have developed a system 
dynamics model of a government 
competitor to private insurance. We utilized 
this model to explore a potential outcomes 
based on different types of policy decisions 
or effects. This was accompl ished by 
developing a set of hypothetical scenarios 
very loosely based on the newly legislated 
policy changes. We found that in general , 
decisions that result in increased physician 
profits will increase physician availability, 
while those that decrease profits wi ll have 
the opposite effect. 
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Appendix 1: Control Parameter 
Settings 
Parameter Control Setting 
Required Coverage 0.95 
Initial Insurance Level 0.6 
Private Turnover 0.52 
Gvt. Dissatisfaction 0.52 
% Able to afford private insurance (long term) 
Min Gvt. Reimbursement Rate 
Gvt. Payment Divergence Rate 
Phys Tax Level 
Gen Tax Multiplier 
Base Entrance Rate 
Base E)(it Rate 
0.15 
0.9 
0.15 
0.4 
0.5 
0.02 
0.02 
